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Abstract
We show that requiring a credit rating agency to rate several new issuers simulta-
neously discourages rating ination and increases the credibility of its ratings. When
the agency rates issuers simultaneously, giving one more good rating lowers the cred-
ibility of all the good ratings it gives, diminishing issuerswillingness to pay for them
and consequently the rating fee. If the number of issuers is large, this e¤ect ensures
an allocation that asymptotically approaches the rst best. While the e¤ect is present
under sequential rating, it is weaker than under simultaneous rating. We show that it
may be worthwhile to synchronize the issuance of corporate bonds so as to benet from
simultaneous rating.
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1 Introduction
Credit rating agencies play an important role in the functioning of nancial markets. They
evaluate issuers creditworthiness and contribute to a more e¢ cient allocation of capital.
The performance of this role by rating agencies critically depends on the credibility of their
ratings. In other words, their ratings must be trusted. After all, as emphasized by the rating
agencies themselves, their ratings constitute only an opinion on borrowersability to repay
their debts.
However, after the 2008 nancial crisis, the impartiality of rating agencies and the cred-
ibility of their ratings have been widely and openly questioned. Doubts on the credibility
of credit ratings have been cast in great part because of concerns and evidence of rating
ination during the years leading to the crisis. For example, in the case of Alt-A mortgage-
backed securities (MBS), about 10% of the tranches issued in the period 2005-2007 rated
safest triple AAAwere either downgraded to junk status or lost their principal by 2009.
The case of CDO bonds was no better. More than 71.3% of such bonds had the same fate
despite being initially rated as Aaa.1 ;2 Credit rating agencies have also been involved in law-
suits for the issues of rating ination. In 2008 a group of investors led by the Abu Dhabi
Commercial Bank sued Moodys and Standard & Poors, accusing them of collaborating with
Morgan Stanley in arranging for some of its nancial products to receive triple-A ratings,
even though much of the underlying collateral was low-quality or subprime mortgage debt.3
More recently, in February 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice sued Standard & Poors
accusing it of inating ratings associated with mortgage securities for the purpose of gaining
market share.4
The current practice in the nancial markets is that rating agencies rate new issuers on
the market (and investors decide whether to invest in each issuer) sequentially, i.e. as they
appear on the market. We argue in this paper that rating ination can be discouraged and
the credibility of ratings improved by requiring a credit rating agency to report the ratings
of a pool of new issuers simultaneously so that investors make decisions on whether to take
any one of their o¤ers only after observing the ratings given to all of them. In particular,
we show that it may be worthwhile to synchronize the issuance of corporate bonds so as to
1See the Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economics Crisis
in the United States, pages 228-229. This report is authenticated U.S. government information.
2As a reference point, observe that the historic cumulative default rate (up to 2007) of corporate bonds
rated AAA by Standard & Poors is only 0.6%. In the case of Moodys the analogous gure is 0.52%. (See
the "House Report 110-835 - Municipal Bond Fairness Act" of September 2008, U.S. Government Printing
O¢ ce.)
3The case is Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank et al v. Morgan Stanley & Co et al, U.S. District Court,
Southern District of New York, No. 08-07508. The parties reached a settlement agreement in April 2013.
The settlement amount was almost 9.5 million dollars.
4The case is United States of America v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc and Standard and Poors Financial
Services LLC, U.S. District Court, General District of California, No. CV13-00779.
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benet from simultaneous rating.
The key e¤ect is that simultaneous rating generates a negative link between the number
of good ratings that a rating agency reports and the value of each of its good ratings. In
other words, for a given pool of issuers simultaneously rated by the agency, the more issuers
receive a good rating, the less credible a good rating becomes. Because of this negative link,
the rating agency faces a trade-o¤. By giving one more good rating it earns one more rating
fee, but that lowers the credibility of all the good ratings it gives, which lowers the issuers
willingness to pay for its ratings (and consequently its rating fees). Because of this trade-o¤,
which arises endogenously, the rating agency has an incentive to issue a limited number of
good ratings.
We show that even when the rating agency rates only two issuers simultaneously, the case
with the lowest possible level of simultaneity in the assignment of ratings, this negative
link enables the agency to create value in a situation where it would not if it rated the issuers
sequentially. The negative link is particularly e¤ective when the pool of issuers simultaneously
rated is large. In this case, the value created by the rating agency asymptotically approaches
the rst-best total surplus.
One key element of simultaneous rating is that investors decide whether to take one o¤er
of bond issuance only after having observed the ratings of all the o¤ers in the pool. This
contrasts with the current practice of sequential rating where the decision on whether to
invest in one issuance is made when the investors observe its rating alone and possibly the
ratings of past issuances. One may expect that the negative link is also present in the case
of sequential rating, as investors can adjust their trust of the present rating based on their
observation of the past ratings given by the same agency. We show the negative link is
present under sequential rating, but it is less e¤ective than under simultaneous rating.
In fact we show that even if investors observe not only the past ratings but also the
performance of the projects rated in the past, in which case the reputation mechanism is
present, the value created under sequential rating can be at most a fraction of the rst-
best surplus. Moreover, this fraction is independent of the discount factor. By contrast,
as mentioned above, the value created by ratings under simultaneous rating approaches the
rst-best surplus. This contrast suggests that it might be worthwhile to change the way in
which credit rating is done in order to realize the benet of simultaneous rating. Specically
rating should be done once in a period when a number of new issuers have entered the
market, so that they can be simultaneously rated; and in the report the rating agency should
disclose the number of issuers that seek a rating from it and the distribution of ratings that
it gives to them. Doing so would lead to synchronization of bond issuance. Therefore, this
paper suggests another benet to synchronizing bond issuance, which practitioners have been
considering mainly for the benet of improving liquidity.5
5See the article The Debt Penaltyin the Financial Times, 11 September 2013.
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One obvious cost of rating new issuers periodically is that for those that enter the market
early on the access to the nancial market and the implementation of their projects are
delayed. Nevertheless, given the frequency with which rating agencies issue new ratings, this
delay need not to be long. A period of one week might su¢ ce. Over 2001-2010, Moodys,
S&P and Fitch issued on average per week, respectively, 285, 275 and 141 corporate bond
ratings.6 Using these numbers, we perform a numerical simulation to compare sequential
rating with simultaneous rating where ratings are issued once a week (e.g. the ratings of
each weeks projects are simultaneously reported at the end of the week). While the surplus
generated by sequential rating can be at most 90% of the surplus associated with the rst-best
allocation, the surplus generated by weekly (simultaneous) rating would be no less than 95%
of the rst-best surplus for agencies that rate as many issuers as Moodys or S&P and no less
than 93% for agencies of the size of Fitch. These results indicate an e¢ ciency gain of weekly
simultaneous rating relative to sequential rating of approximately ve percentage points in
the case of Moodys and S&P, and of three percentage points in the case of Fitch. In all the
three cases, the benet stemming from the economy of scale brought about by simultaneous
rating more than compensates the cost of delays in the implementation of projects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related
literature. In Section 3, we present the model used to study simultaneous rating. This
model is analyzed in Section 4, where we highlight the importance of the negative link for
the credibility of ratings. In Section 5, we analyze sequential rating and its shortcomings.
Section 6 discusses the implementation of simultaneous rating in practice. In Section 7 we
discuss some robustness issues related to our key ndings and Section 8 concludes. All the
proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
We show that simultaneous reporting of credit ratings generates a mechanism that discour-
ages rating ination by a rating agency, thereby contributing to increase the credibility of
its ratings. Other mechanisms have been considered in the literature. The most notable of
them is the reputation mechanism see, among others, Kuhner (2001); Mathis, McAndrews
and Rochet (2009); Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013); Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012); and
Frenkel (2015). The reputation mechanism highlights that a rating agency will refrain from
giving a good rating to a bad issuer because of the concern that its future credibility and
prot will be damaged following the (likely) default by the issuer.7 This mechanism relies on
two factors: repeated interaction and the comparison between the ratings obtained by issuers
6These numbers are obtained from the FISD data set.
7Interestingly, Frenkel (2015) shows that when a rating agency has two reputationsone with investors and
another with issuersreputation concerns may actually lead to the ination of ratings by the rating agency.
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and their ex-post performance. The mechanism studied in this paper depends on neither of
them. It works in a static environment and even when issuersperformance is not observed
by investors. While in most of this paper we abstract from the reputation mechanism, we
also analyze the case where both mechanisms are present. In particular, we show that a
credit rating agency can create more value under simultaneous rating than under sequential
rating even when the reputation mechanism is present.8
The literature has also highlighted that the credibility of credit ratings could be improved
by addressing, in the rst place, the conict of interest that may generate the bias in the
ratings. One source of the conict of interest is the fact that credit rating agencies are paid
by issuers precisely those who they rate and that such payment usually occurs only if the
issuer accepts the rating. Gri¢ n and Tang (2011), for example, provide empirical evidence of
rating ination due to conict of interest by comparing the CDO assumptions made by the
ratings department and by the surveillance department within the same rating agency. Xia
and Strobl (2012) provide empirical evidence for rating ination due to the issuer-pay model
by comparing the ratings issued by Standard & Poors which follows the issuer-pay model to
those issued by the Egan-Jones Rating Company which adopts the investor-pay model.
One way of solving such conict of interests is to require that investors, rather than
issuers, pay for credit ratings, as was the case before the 1970s. In a similar spirit, Mathis,
McAndrews and Rochet (2009) advocate a new business model in which the platforms where
the securities are traded pay for the securities ratings. Yet another way of reducing the
above mentioned conict of interest is to require issuers to pay an up-front rating fee before
receiving their ratings so that the fee is not a concern to the rating agency when it decides on
the issuersratings. This suggestion has been partially implemented in the Cuomo agreement
of 2008.9 In the present paper, we assume that issuers pay for their ratings, that rating fees
can depend on ratings, and that the credit rating agency does not disclose a (bad) rating
that the issuer refuses to accept. Hence, we purposely analyze the potential benets of
simultaneous rating in an environment that is highly conducive to rating ination. We show
that simultaneous rating can complement these insitutional arrangements.
Several articles have also studied the impact of competition on the credibility and in-
formativeness of ratings provided by a credit rating agency or more generally by a certier
(e.g., Lizzeri, 1999; Miao, 2009; Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009; Camanho, Deb and Liu, 2012;
Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro, 2012). While Lizzeri (1999) shows that competition between
8In this literature and in our paper the credit quality of the issuers is assumed to be exogenous. Goldstein
and Huang (2017), however, consider how it may be a¤ected by credit ratings through a feedback loop. They
show that because of this feedback loop the presence of credit rating agencies may reduce economic e¢ ciency.
9In 2008, Andrew Cuomo, then the New York State Attorney General, reached an agreement with the
three major rating agencies, Moodys, S&P, and Fitch. The rating agencies agreed that, in rating Residential
MBSs, they would charge up-front fees and disclose every rating deal, even those that were not accepted by
the issuers. For more details see the Attorney Generals o¢ ce press release at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-
release/attorney-general-cuomo-announces-landmark-reform-agreements-nations-three-principal.
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certiers can lead to full information revelation, Skreta and Veldkamp (2009), Camanho, Deb
and Liu (2012) and Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012) show that competition between credit
rating agencies can in fact decrease the informativeness of credit ratings and the reputation
of the rating agencies.10 In Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) and Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro
(2012), this is because competition allows for credit rating shopping. In Camanho, Deb and
Liu (2012) it is because it hinders rating agenciesability to sustain a high reputation. An
important di¤erence amongst these articles is that Lizzeri (1999) assumes that the certier
can commit to a disclosure rule and the other articles assume that it cannot.11 While we
abstract from competition issues in this paper, we also assume that rating agencies cannot
commit to a disclosure rule. They are free to give an issuer any rating after having observed
its credit quality.
Finally, the paper is related with a strand of literature that explores the idea that in-
formation transmission and e¢ ciency may be enhanced by joining the decisions on several
matters (e.g., Damiano, Li and Suen, 2008; Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2007; Jackson and
Sonnenschein, 2007). The papers in this literature, however, ignore the specicities of the
market for credit ratings and, as such, fail to identify the negative link which plays a central
role in the present paper.12
3 Model
The model presented here captures the case of simultaneous rating. In the model, a credit
rating agency evaluates the creditworthiness of several rms simultaneously, and then in-
vestors decide whether or not to invest in each rm. We later adapt the model to analyze
the case of sequential rating.
Suppose there areN  2 penniless issuers (rms), a pool of investors, and one credit rating
10The empirical evidence on the e¤ect of competition on ratingsquality is mixed. Becker and Milbourn
(2011) nd that increased competition due to Fitchs entry in the credit ratings market in 1997 as a global
and full-service ratings agency coincides with lower quality ratings from the incumbents S&P and Moodys.
Like S&P and Moodys, Fitch is an issuer-paid rating agency. In contrast, Xia (2014) nds that the entry
in the credit ratings market of EJR, an investor-paid rating agency, led to an improvement in S&Ps ratings
quality.
11Another important di¤erence is that Lizzeri (1999) takes a mechanism design approach to the modelling
of the certier. Faure-Grimaud, Peyrache and Quesada (2009) is another example of an article that follows
this line of modelling certiers. They also use a mechanism design approach to model the certier and assume
that the certier can commit to a disclosure rule.
12Damiano, Li and Suen (2008) compare an agency that rates several clients separately with one that rates
all clients together. However, they do not model the market for credit ratings and consider a costly signaling
model as in Spence (1973) where a rating a¤ects the agencys payo¤ in itself. By contrast, we consider
a model of cheap-talk where ratings a¤ect the rating agency only through equilibrium market interactions.
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007) analyze a communication model between a sender and a receiver. Jackson
and Sonnenschein (2007) use a mechanism design approach to analyze a social choice problem.
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agency (CRA hereafter).13 All agents are risk neutral and protected by limited liability, and
the risk free interest rate is normalized to zero. Each issuer has one investment project and
seeks to nance it. A project requires an investment of one unit of funds and either succeeds
and returns R, or fails and returns nothing. Projects can be of two types: good (g) or bad
(b). A project of type i 2 fg; bg succeeds with probability qi. We assume that good projects
have a positive net present value (NPV), while bad projects destroy value, i.e.,
qbR < 1 < qgR. (1)
In what follows, we denote by Vi the value created by a project of type i, i.e., Vi  qiR   1
for all i 2 fg; bg. It is common knowledge that ex ante a project is good with probability p
and projectsqualities are independent. We assume
(pqg + (1  p)qb)R < 1, (2)
which means that nancing a project at random destroys value.
The quality of an issuers project is known to the issuer only. However, issuers can hire
the CRA to rate their projects before they seek funds from the investors. Each issuer decides
whether to hire the CRA without observing the decision of the other issuers. If hired by an
issuer, the CRA observes the quality of the issuers project at no cost.14 After observing the
quality of the projects of all the issuers that solicited a rating, the CRA decides for each of
them a rating r 2 fgood,badg. This decision determines the total number of good ratings k
the CRA plans to issue. Then the CRA communicates to each issuer individually the decision
on its rating and on the total number of good ratings k. Issuers that reject the rating owe
nothing to the CRA and remain unrated. Issuers that accept the rating agree to pay the
CRA a rating fee f and have their rating publicly disclosed. Since at this time issuers are
penniless, they pay the fee ex post with the revenue of their projects. Rating fees are not
observed by investors, and investors learn that an issuer has hired the CRA only if a rating
for that issuer is publicly disclosed.
Upon observing all the ratings issued by the CRA (if any), investors decide which issuers
they will fund (if any). If investors decide to fund an issuer they demand a repayment C,
which by limited liability the issuer will pay if and only if its project succeeds. In other
words, the issuer defaults if its project fails. We assume the market for capital is long on the
13We consider the case of a monopolist rating agency because it allows us to highlight the benets of the
simultaneity in the reporting of credit ratings in the simplest possible way. In Section 7, we discuss the
implications of competition between rating agencies for our mechanism.
14The assumption that the CRA observes the quality of a project at no cost is made for simplicity of
exposition. The assumption that the CRA evaluates a rms project only if hired by the rm rules out the
possibility of unsolicited credit ratings. For an analysis of why rating agencies may wish to issue unsolicited
ratings and their impact on welfare see Fulghieri, Strobl and Xia (2013).
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supply side. This means that investors have more funds than those that can be absorbed by
rms and, as a result, they are satised with an expected net return of zero. Specically, if
investors believe that a given project (issuer) is good with probability , they will require a
repayment C to invest in the project such that
(qg + (1  )qb)C   1 = 0. (3)
The lower the belief  that the project is good, the higher the repayment they demand.
For su¢ ciently low values of , that repayment exceeds R, in which case they refrain from
investing in the project. The ratings issued by the CRA are important because they may
a¤ect the investorsbeliefs about the quality of a project.
Given the investorsfunding decisions, the funded projects (if any) are implemented. We
assume that if a project succeeds, the issuer rst pays investors the agreed repayment, then
pays the CRA the agreed fee, and keeps the remainder as prot. If a project fails, because
of limited liability, all parties obtain nothing. Hence, the expected payo¤ of an issuer whose
project is of quality q, who pays f to the CRA for a rating, and whose project is nanced
at a repayment C is q(R   C   f). The payo¤ of an issuer whose project is not nanced is
zero. Finally, the expected prot for the CRA from selling a rating at a fee f to an issuer of
quality q is qf if his project is nanced and zero if it is not.
We complete the description of the model by specifying how rating fees are set. We
assume f = (R   C), where  2 (0; 1]. The proportion  (which can be interpreted as
the commission rate usually charged by rating agencies) reects the bargaining power of the
CRA relative to the issuers.15 The case of a CRA with full bargaining power that makes take
it or leave it o¤ers to issuers corresponds to the case where  = 1. Observe that the rating
fees considered here exhibit the following three features. First, they are paid ex post, out of
the revenue of the project. Second, the fee paid by an issuer is related to his cost of nance,
C. Third, an issuer pays the fee only if he accepts the rating o¤ered by the CRA. However,
the main message of the paper, namely that simultaneous rating enables the rating agency
to create more economic value than sequential rating, is robust to alternative specications
of the rating fee. It continues to hold if: (a) the fee is of the same format as above but paid
ex ante when the issuer accepts the rating (assuming the issuer has some funds to pay it);
or (b) the fee is of a xed amount (i.e., independent of C) and again paid when the issuer
accepts the rating; or (c) the fee is paid up front when the issuer requests a rating and still
does not know what the rating will be, as in the Cuomo agreement. We analyze case (a) in
the discussion of Proposition 1, and cases (b) and (c) in Subsection 7.1 where we discuss the
15We will focus on equilibria where unrated issuers are not nanced obtaining zero prot. Therefore, if a
rating allows an issuer of quality q to nance his project at a repayment C < R, the (expected) value of the
rating for the issuer is q(R   C). The current rating fee implies than the CRA appropriates a proportion 
of this value.
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robustness of the results obtained in the paper.
The strategies of the issuers, CRA, and investors can be summarized as follows. Based on
the quality of their project, an issuer rst decides whether to request the CRA a rating and
then whether to accept or reject it. The CRA, on the other hand, decides on the rating of the
issuers who request one based on the qualities of their projects. Finally, investors decide on
which projects to invest and on the repayment required based on the projectsratings. We
use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) as the equilibrium concept and focus on equilibria
where a good rating signals good quality and a bad rating bad quality.16 That is, we focus
on equilibria where investors believe that an unrated issuer or an issuer with a bad rating is
of good quality with a probability no greater than the prior p. Given this, issuers pay only
for a good rating, and reject any o¤er of a bad rating.
4 Simultaneous Rating
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium outcomes in the model described above. We
are interested in the CRAs rule for rating issuers, the informativeness of the CRAs ratings,
and the e¢ ciency in the allocation of funds. We analyze separately two cases regarding the
total number of issuers. To illustrate how and why credit ratings can be informative and
create value under simultaneous rating, we rst analyze the case of two issuers (i.e., N = 2).
We then analyze the case of a large number of issuers and provide asymptotic results on the
value created by the CRA and on the e¢ ciency.
But before proceeding to that analysis, it is useful to briey mention two benchmark
cases, one in which no CRA operates on the market, the other in which there is only one
issuer (i.e. N = 1). In both cases, no value is created in equilibrium: either no project is
nanced, or the probability of a good project being nanced and the probability of a bad
project being nanced are such that, in expectation, the value created by the implementation
of good projects is completely dissipated by the implementation of bad projects. In the
rst benchmark case, this is essentially because funding an issuer at random destroys value.
Regarding the second case, suppose the rating created value and therefore the CRA obtained
a positive fee for it. Then the CRA would o¤er a good rating to the issuer regardless of
his quality. But this means the rating would be uninformative and could not create value,
contradicting the initial supposition.
16In the current framework the ratings of the CRA are no more than cheap talk. As a result, there exists
an equilibrium in which they are totally disregarded by investors and the CRA just babbles(i.e., assigns
them in a totally random way). Also, it is possible that equilibria in which investors believe that a good
rating means something bad about the issuers quality and a bad rating something good exist. In this paper,
we discard all these equilibria.
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4.1 Two Issuers
SupposeN = 2. Our rst observation is that credit ratings cannot perfectly reveal the quality
of all issuers. In other words, there is no equilibrium in which the CRA gives a good rating
to an issuer if and only if the issuer is good.
To see this, suppose to the contrary that such an equilibrium exists. In it, investors
necessarily believe that a project is good when the CRA rates it as good. That is,  = 1 for
any project that receives a good rating. This means by (3) that investors require a repayment
C = 1=qg < R to nance a project with a good rating. But given this repayment, in the
event that no project is good, instead of o¤ering no good rating obtaining no fee as the
equilibrium prescribes, the CRA is better o¤ deviating by o¤ering a good rating to both
issuers. By doing so, it obtains f = (R  1=qg) for each good rating and an expected prot
of 2qb(R  1=qg) > 0.
Credit ratings cannot fully eliminate the asymmetry of information between issuers and
investors, but they can reduce it and create value. Let k denote the investorsbelief that
an issuer with a good rating has a good project when k good ratings are issued by the CRA.
Similarly, let Ck denote the repayment demanded by investors to fund an issuer with a good
rating when k good ratings are issued by the CRA. Finally, let   qg  qb, and observe that
condition (2) can be written as p <  Vb=(R) and that the ex-ante probability that at least
one project is good is 1  (1  p)2 = p (2  p). We can claim the following.
Proposition 1 Suppose N = 2. If p (2  p)   Vb=(R), then there is no equilibrium in
which the CRA creates value. If p (2  p) >  Vb=(R), however, there exist a continuum of
value-creating equilibria. In any of these equilibria, the credibility of a good rating decreases
and the repayment demanded by investors increases with the number of good ratings, i.e.
1 > 2 and C1 < C2. Moreover, in all but one of these equilibria, with a positive probability
the CRA gives both issuers a good rating and both are nanced at C2 < R.
When the ex-ante probability that at least one issuer is good is su¢ ciently low (i.e. lower
than  Vb=(R)), it is very likely that all issuers on the market are bad and that any issuer
the CRA rates as good is actually bad. In this case, investors will not trust the CRAs ratings
and no value will be created. If instead the ex-ante probability that at least one issuer on the
market is good exceeds  Vb=(R), the ratings issued by the CRA can be credible enough to
create value. Indeed, in this case, there exist a continuum of value-creating equilibria.17
The same two reasons explain why the CRA creates value in all the value-creating equi-
libria. The rst is the existence of a negative link between the credibility (and value) of a
good rating and the number of good ratings issued by the CRA. As stated in Proposition 1,
17A complete characterization of the equilibria in which the CRA creates value is given in the proof of
Proposition 1 and the Online Appendix.
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1 > 2 and C1 < C2 in all value-creating equilibria, which implies that the rating fee if only
one good rating is issued, (R C1), is greater than that if two are issued, (R C2). This
link discourages rating ination: by issuing one more good rating the CRA may collect one
more fee, but the rating fee obtained per good rating is lower. The second reason is that,
conditional on the decision to issue any given number of good ratings, the CRA gives them
to the best issuers on the market. In this case with two issuers, this means that if the CRA
issues only one good rating, it always gives it to a good issuer if there is one. The CRA does
so because the expected prot from giving the good rating to a good issuer, qg(R  C1), is
greater than that from giving it to a bad issuer, qb(R  C1).
Because of the rst reason, the CRA does not give a good rating to all issuers regardless
of their qualities. And because of the second reason, an issuer with a good rating is more
likely to be good than an issuer without a good rating. Together, they imply that a good
rating signals a quality better than the prior, giving good issuers a chance of being nanced.
Indeed, if the CRA gives only one issuer a good rating, this issuer will be the better of the two
and it will be worth nancing it. Interestingly, even though the ex-ante probability of both
issuers being good is (considerably) lower than the probability of at least one issuer being
good, in all but one equilibrium, with a positive probability the CRA rates both issuers as
good and the ratings are trusted such that investors nance both issuers.
We conclude the analysis of this two-issuer case with two remarks. First, the timing
of the rating fee payment matters for none of the two reasons why the CRA creates value.
Therefore, it has no e¤ect on the mechanism highlighted in the paper. Because in the model
issuers are penniless at the outset, they can only pay the rating fees ex post with the revenue
of their projects. If instead they had some funds and rating fees were paid at the moment
of the issuance of the ratings (i.e., before projects being nanced), the rating fee paid by
an issuer of quality q would be qf = q(R   C), since at that moment the value of a good
rating for the issuer would be q(R  C). Clearly, the negative link would still be present, as
the rating fee would still be negatively related with C and hence with k. Moreover, also in
this case, the CRA would be better o¤ giving a good rating to a good issuer than to a bad
issuer, as qg(R  C) > qb(R  C).
Second, in our model the CRA is better o¤ giving a good rating to a good issuer than to
a bad issuer because a good issuer pays more (in expectation) for the rating. However, in
reality, rating agencies may prefer to give a good rating to a good issuer than to a bad issuer
also for other reasons. One of them is the preservation of a good reputation. Since a bad
issuer is more likely to default than a good issuer, rating agencies will be more reluctant to
give a good rating to a bad issuer than to a good issuer. Interestingly, what is important for
the mechanism highlighted in the paper is that rating agencies have a preference for good
issuers, not the specic reason for it.
11
4.2 A Large Number of Issuers
We now consider the case of a large number of issuers and obtain asymptotic results on the
value created by the CRA under simultaneous rating.
We focus on equilibria where investors nance all the issuers with a good rating at a xed
repayment of C < R, so long as the total number of good ratings issued by the CRA does
not exceed a threshold k. In other words, the CRA is asked to recommend at most k out
of the N projects. The negative link, therefore, is that a good rating is worth R   C ex
post (conditional on the success of the issuers project) if the total number of good ratings
is no greater than k, otherwise it is worthless. In such equilibria the CRA does not miss
the opportunity to earn one more rating fee and always recommends k issuers. As the CRA
issues the same number of good ratings regardless of the number of good projects, we call
equilibria of this type pooling equilibria. There is, however, a slight abuse of language in
doing so. Pooling occurs only regarding the total number of good ratings issued by the CRA.
The identity of the issuers that are rated as good depends on the realization of issuerstypes.
Finally, as argued above, the CRA will optimally give good ratings rst to good issuers, and
only if it cannot nd k of them, it will ll the gap by giving the remaining good ratings to
bad issuers. That is, the CRA will indeed recommend the best k amongst the N projects.
If the number of issuers N is su¢ ciently large, an equilibrium of this type always exists.
Roughly speaking, by the Law of Large Numbers, the CRA will not have di¢ culty nding
Np good projects. Thus, if k is close to Np, investors will correctly believe that a project
recommended by the CRA is good with a high probability. In fact, for the same number
of issuers N , pooling equilibria with a di¤erent threshold k coexist. An important aspect
about pooling equilibria with di¤erent thresholds of good ratings is that they di¤er in the
associated expected total surplus (i.e. in the level of e¢ ciency). Given a threshold k; relative
to the rst-best allocation in which a project is nanced if and only if it is good, there are
two types of loss. One occurs whenever the number of good projects on the market is greater
than k, in which case some of them do not receive a good rating, are not nanced, and their
NPV is lost. The other occurs when the number of good projects on the market is smaller
than k, in which case the CRA will ll the gap with bad projects, which are then nanced
and destroy value. An increase in the value of k reduces the rst type of loss but increases
the second. For any given number of issuers N , the optimal value of k balances these two
types of loss.
The next proposition characterizes how asymptotically the optimal k depends on N and
how the e¢ ciency in the optimal pooling equilibrium (i.e., the pooling equilibrium with the
optimal k) approaches that of the rst-best allocation.
Proposition 2 Consider the case where the number of issuers N is large. The optimal
threshold is asymptotically k = Np+ 
p
Np(1  p), where  is implicitly dened by () =
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Vg=(Vg   Vb) with (:) denoting the c.d.f. of the standard Normal distribution. Moreover, in
the pooling equilibrium with this optimal threshold: (i) the expected value created asymptoti-
cally approaches the expected value of the rst-best allocation; and (ii) the probability that a
project with a good rating is indeed good approaches one. In both cases, the approximation is
in the order of N 1=2.
In the asymptotically optimal pooling equilibrium, k is equal to the unconditional mean of
the number of good projects, Np; adjusted by  times the standard deviation of the number
of good projects. The magnitude of this adjustment depends on the value created by a good
project and the value destroyed by a bad project. Specically, as the value created by a good
project Vg increases relative to the value destroyed by a bad project  Vb,  increases and the
optimal k is higher. The intuition for this result is simple. As Vg increases relative  Vb, the
loss from leaving good projects unnanced becomes more important relative to the loss from
nancing bad projects. Therefore, it is optimal to increase k. In the special case in which a
good project creates as much value as a bad project destroys, i.e. when Vg =  Vb,  = 0 and
the optimal k equals the expected number of good projects, Np.
The analysis has so far highlighted the potential gains generated by a CRA when rating
issuers simultaneously. Proposition 2, in particular, shows that those gains can be very large.
While the rst-best allocation is never attainable, when the number of issuers is large the
di¤erence between the value created by the CRA and the rst-best total surplus becomes
negligible.
What drives this result is the negative link between the value of a good rating and the
number of such ratings. One may wonder whether the negative link also works in the case of
sequential rating, and, in case it does, whether it works equally well. A consideration based
on statistics would suggest an a¢ rmative answer to both questions. For example, Proposition
2 is largely driven by the Law of Large Numbers, which applies to dynamic settings equally
well. That is, it applies equally well to the case of throwing the same coin 1000 times and
to the case of throwing 1000 coins of the same attributes once. However, this consideration
ignores the fact that the CRAs incentives under sequential rating may di¤er from those
under simultaneous rating. As we will see, because of this di¤erence in incentives, the value
created by the CRA under sequential rating can approach only a fraction of the rst-best
total surplus.
5 Sequential Rating
Consider now a dynamic version of the model where the CRA rates issuers sequentially.
More specically, suppose there are N periods and in each period a di¤erent issuer seeks to
nance its project, which matures in the same period. All the other aspects of the model
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remain unchanged. Hence, in any given period, the issuer decides whether to obtain a credit
rating from the CRA; if the issuer asks for a rating, the CRA observes the quality of its
project and rates it; the issuer decides whether to accept the rating and then seeks funding
from investors. As before, the investors have abundant funds and are satised with a zero
net return (because the project matures within the period). The period discount factor is
 2 (0; 1) and is the same for all agents. Finally, there is a saving asset with a gross return
rate of 1= over a period so that investors are indi¤erent between consumption and saving
in each period.
Suppose the investors in each period observe the rating given in that period and the
entire history of ratings given by the CRA. As in the baseline model, they do not observe
the performance of previously nanced projects. (The case where they do will be analyzed
later.) Thus, the credibility investors give in any given period to a good rating depends only
on the history of ratings. We begin by analyzing the case where N = 2 and then the case
where N is innite. As before, no value is created if no CRA operates on the market.
5.1 Two Issuers
Suppose there are two periods and one issuer per period. We can use backward induction to
characterize the equilibrium interaction between the CRA, issuers and investors.
In the second period, the CRAs rating cannot create value. The situation is identical
to the second benchmark case discussed at the beginning of Section 4 where the CRA rates
one issuer only. As discussed, no value is created in this case. But the CRA cannot create
value in period one either. The decisions made by the CRA and the investors in the rst
period have no impact on their second-period payo¤s: in the second period they obtain zero,
as no value is created. This means that the reasoning applied to analyze the second period
also applies to the rst period. Since credit ratings can create value in neither period, they
cannot create value at all. For convenience of exposition, we state this without further proof
in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 The CRA creates no value if rating is sequential and N = 2.
This proposition constitutes the rst step in highlighting the di¤erence between simulta-
neous rating and sequential rating. With two issuers, ratings can create value under simul-
taneous rating but not under sequential rating. The reason for the di¤erence is that under
sequential rating (with two issuers), the negative link between the number of good ratings
issued and the fee obtained for a good rating is not present. The CRAs decision to o¤er a
good rating in the second period has no e¤ect on the fee received for a good rating in the
rst period. This means that the negative link is not present in the last period. And since
rating generates no fee in the second period regardless of the rst-period rating decisions,
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the negative link is also not present in the rst period. Without it the CRA has no incentive
to limit the number of good ratings issued. Its ratings lack credibility and create no value.
The unraveling argument that underpins the results in the case of two issuers holds for
any nite number of issuers. As such, the CRA cannot create value under sequential rating
when the number of issuers N is nite.
One may wonder whether the CRA could solve the problem of the lack of credibility of
its ratings under sequential rating if it could commit ex-ante to issue only a limited number
of good ratings. The answer to the question is negative. Suppose N = 2 and the CRA can
commit ex-ante to issue only one good rating over the two periods. If the CRA does not
rate the rst period issuer as good, it will rate the second period issuer as good regardless of
its quality (if it obtains a positive fee for the good rating). This implies that investors will
never trust a good rating issued in the second period, and such rating is necessarily worthless.
As a result, the CRA will always issue a good rating in period one. But applying the same
reasoning, we conclude that a good rating issued in period one must also be worthless. Hence,
commitment by the CRA to issue a limited number of good ratings is not su¢ cient to ensure
the credibility of its ratings under sequential rating.
5.2 An Innite Number of Issuers
Suppose now that there are an innite number of periods and in each period a new issuer
enters the market. In other words, the CRA expects to be in the rating business forever.
As the CRA expects to rate issuers indenitely, its rating decision in any given period can
potentially a¤ect the value of its ratings in all future periods, creating room for the negative
link to emerge and for the CRA to create value. We derive below an upper bound for the value
created by the CRA and compare it with the value created by the CRA under simultaneous
rating.
Before presenting such upper bound, we discuss how equilibria where the CRA creates
value might emerge. The CRA creates value only if its ratings are at least partially credible;
and its ratings are credible only if the CRA does not give every type of issuer a good rating.
Therefore, there must exist a cost for the CRA of issuing a good rating. Such cost stems
from a reduction in the credibility of the CRAs future ratings, which creates a negative
link between the issuance of a good rating and the value of future ratings. In value-creating
equilibria, investors adjust their trust in a rating based on the history of the CRAs ratings.
For example, as in the pooling equilibria considered in subsection 4.2, they may check the
ratio of the number of good ratings issued in the past to the number of issuers that came to
the market, k=N , and adjust their trust in a rating accordingly. Investors may adjust their
beliefs given the history of ratings in other ways, leading to di¤erent equilibria with a possibly
di¤erent value created by the CRA. The next proposition establishes an upper bound for the
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value created by the CRA across all equilibria. Note that the discounted rst-best total
surplus, namely, the value created when in each period the project is nanced if and only if
it is good, is pVg=(1  ). In what follows we let V FBs  pVg=(1  ).
Proposition 4 For any  < 1 , the value created by the CRA under sequential rating is no
larger than (1  qb=qg) V FBs .
Thus, at most a fraction 1   qb=qg of the rst-best total surplus can be realized under
sequential rating. This result, which is independent of the value of the discount factor ,
contrasts with that obtained in the case of simultaneous rating. As stated in Proposition
2, the value created by the CRA under simultaneous rating asymptotically approaches the
rst-best value. Two factors explain the di¤erence.
First, the e¤ect of the negative link is stronger under simultaneous rating than under
sequential rating, providing the CRA with stronger disincentives for rating ination. Under
simultaneous rating, the CRAs decision to issue one additional good rating lowers the value
of all the ratings issued by the CRA. Under sequential rating, that decision can lower only
the value of the ratings issued by the CRA in the future; it does not a¤ect the rating fees
collected by the CRA in the past. This is the same reason why the CRA fails to create value
under sequential rating when the number of issuers is nite. In that case, in the last period,
as there is no future for the CRA, the negative link completely breaks down.
Second, good projects are more likely to be abandoned under sequential rating than under
simultaneous rating. This is because the order with which good and bad projects appear on
the market matters under sequential rating. To briey illustrate this point, consider the event
where k out of N projects are good. Suppose also that under sequential rating, after issuing
a good rating, the CRA has to wait l periods until it can issue another good rating that will
be trusted by investors. If the k good projects appear on the market consecutively, there is
a congestion of good projects and many will necessarily be abandoned. Under simultaneous
rating, the order with which good projects appear is irrelevant, and there is no loss of surplus
due to congestion of good projects.
5.3 The Reputation Mechanism
It is well known that reputational concerns play an important role in disciplining rating
agencies against rating ination, thereby contributing to increase the credibility and value
of credit ratings. Yet, we show here that even when the reputation mechanism is present, in
general, the maximum value created by ratings under sequential rating is still only a fraction
of the rst-best surplus.
Suppose N =1 and investors observe the outcome of the previously nanced projects in
addition to the history of ratings given by the CRA. Since investors can compare the ratings
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of past projects with their performance and adjust the credibility they give to the CRAs
ratings accordingly, the reputation mechanism is present. We recompute an upper bound for
the value created by the CRA in this setting. Recall that the value of the rst-best allocation
is V FBs  pVg=(1  ).
Proposition 5 For any  < 1, the value created by the CRA under sequential rating when
investors observe the performance of past projects is no larger than (qg qb)=(qg qgqb)V FBs .
The proof of this proposition is similar to that of Proposition 4 and is relegated to an
online appendix. The upper-bound for the value created reaches the value of the rst-best
allocation only if qg = 1, i.e. only in the special case where a good project never fails. In
this case, a failure of a project recommended (i.e. rated good) by the CRA indicates the
CRA recommended a bad project. If the discount factor  is su¢ ciently high, the rst-best
allocation can be implemented by the investors playing a trigger strategy where they fully
trust the CRA as long as no project recommended in the past has failed, and never trust the
CRA again if otherwise. If qg < 1, however, a good project fails with a positive probability, as
does a bad project. This trigger strategy wrongly punishes the CRA with some probability
and is unable to generate the rst-best allocation. Actually, as (qg   qb)=(qg   qgqb) < 1
when qg < 1, Proposition 4 implies that no strategy can attain the rst-best allocation in
any equilibrium. And at most a fraction (qg   qb)=(qg   qgqb) of the rst-best surplus can be
generated. Once again, this contrasts with the case of simultaneous rating where the value
created by the CRA asymptotically approaches the value of the rst-best surplus.
6 Implementation of Simultaneous Rating in Practice
The analysis of simultaneous rating done so far assumes that several issuers are already on
the market seeking to nance their projects. But in the real world issuers enter the market
sequentially. Firms approach the nancial market as opportunities to develop new projects
emerge. Since issuers enter the market sequentially, the implementation of simultaneous
rating in practice requires waiting until several of them have entered the market. Waiting,
however, is costly. Issuers entering the market early on have to wait to be rated and to
obtain funding from investors, which delays their projects. Thus, there is a trade-o¤ with
the implementation of simultaneous rating: it generates an economy of scale in rating as
illustrated in the two previous sections, but it may also cause delays in the implementation
of projects.
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6.1 The basic trade-o¤
To formalize this trade-o¤, consider the setting of the previous section where there are an
innite number of periods and one issuer entering the market in each period. Let the length
of waiting be bN periods. That is, the issuers arriving on the market in periods 1, 2, ... bN   1
wait until period bN and then, in that period, all the bN issuers (including the issuer that
arrives in period bN ) are simultaneously rated by the CRA and issue bonds to investors.
Similarly, the issuers arriving in periods bN + 1; bN + 2; :::; 2 bN   1 wait until period 2 bN
to be simultaneously rated, and so on. By Proposition 2, for bN large, the expected value
created (in a cycle of bN periods) is a di¤erence of order 1=p bN away from the rst-best
value (when the issuers are already in the market) bNpVg; more precisely, the value created is
approximately bNpVg (1  c1=p bN), where c > 0 is independent of bN .18 Hence, evaluated
at the rst period of the cycle, the value created with these bN projects under simultaneous
rating is V bN   bN 1  bNpVg(1  c=p bN), while the rst-best value where they are nanced
immediately as they enter the market if they are good is V FB = pVg  (1 +  + ::: bN 1). The
e¢ ciency relative to the rst-best for these bN projects is thus given by
S bN  V bNV FB 

bN 1
(1 +  + :::N 1)= bN (1 
r
1bN c)  eS bN . (4)
Observe that S bN is also the ratio of the value created by simultaneous rating every bN periods
to the rst-best value, when all the projects are taken into account, i.e. when all cycles of bN
periods are taken into account. The rst term of eS bN represents the relative cost of waiting
incurred by issuers. The denominator, (1++:::
bN 1)= bN , is the average discount factor in the
rst-best case where a good project arriving in a given period t is immediately implemented
and thus its present value in period one is discounted with factor t 1. The numerator, 
bN 1,
is the discount factor in the case of simultaneous rating, where all projects are implemented
in period bN and thus their value is discounted by  bN 1. The second term, measures the
e¢ ciency in rating relative to the rst-best, whose loss, as noted earlier, is in order of
q
1= bN .
Using this formalization, we can clearly see how the length of waiting, bN , a¤ects the
benet of simultaneous rating and the cost of waiting. The rst term of eS bN decreases withbN , which captures the fact that the cost of waiting increases with bN . The second term
increases with bN , which captures the economy of scale associated with simultaneous rating:
the greater the number of issuers rated simultaneously, the smaller the e¢ ciency loss relative
to the rst-best value. It is not di¢ cult to show that at a unique bN these two e¤ects
18While we use here the asymptotic approximation, observe that in the case of the binomial distribution
this involves only a small error even for low values of N . For example, for a binomial with probability of
success of 1/2 and N = 16, the di¤erence between the true cdf and its the asymptotic approximation never
exceeds 0.002 (see Mosteller, Rourke and Thomas, 1961, page 277).
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are perfectly balanced and eS bN is maximized. Moreover, this optimal bN increases with the
discount factor  and goes to innity as  goes to one because a higher value of  implies a
lower waiting cost and, as  approaches one, the waiting cost approaches zero.
6.2 A Numerical Simulation
In this numerical simulation, we compare sequential rating with simultaneous rating where
ratings are issued once a week (i.e., the ratings of each weeks projects are simultaneously
reported at the end of the week). Giving reasonable values to the parameters, we obtain that
it is worthwhile to wait one week to rate issuers simultaneously.
Proposition 5 o¤ers an upper bound for the value created under sequential rating. That
upper bound, which holds for all values of  < 1 and takes into account repuational e¤ects,
is (qg   qb)=(qg   qgqb)  V FBs . Dividing it by V FBs , we obtain that the maximum possible
e¢ ciency of sequential rating relative to the rst-best allocation is
Es =
qg   qb
qg   qgqb .
We will compare this measure of e¢ ciency with its counterpart in the case of simultaneous
rating done weekly.
Instead of using an asymptotic approximation for the value created by simultaneous rating
in a cycle of a week, we use the actual value. Suppose N issuers (i.e., projects) appear on
the market every week and consider an equilibrium where k of them receive a good rating
and are nanced. The expected value created, evaluated at the end of the week is
V (k;N) = kVg
XN
n=k
Pn +
Xk 1
n=0
Pn(nVg + (k   n)Vb),
where Pn is the probability that n out of the N projects are good.19 If we let d denote the
daily discount factor, the e¢ ciency of simultaneously rating in a given week (i.e., in a period
of 5 business days) relative to the rst-best allocation is given by
Ew =
4dV (k;N)
N
5
pVg(1 + d + :::+ 
4
d)
.
The numerator is the value created under simultaneous rating evaluated at the beginning of
the week. The denominator is the value created in the rst-best allocation, where the good
projects (out of the N=5 that enter the market daily) are nanced without delay.20 Clearly,
19In our model a project is good with probability p and therefore Pn = N !n!(N n)!p
n(1 p)N n. The equilibria
used here are the pooling equilibria described in Section 4.2 where k issuers receive a good rating regardless
of the number of good issuers on the market.
20We assume no intraday discounting in this simulation.
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Ew is also the e¢ ciency of weekly simultaneous rating relative to the rst-best allocation
when all cycles of one week are taken into account.
To compute the e¢ ciency measures Es and Ew, we use the following parameter values.
For the number of projects N , we use the number of corporate bond ratings issued by the
three major ratings agencies. Using the FISD data set, we obtain that during the period
2001-2010, Moodys, S&P and Fitch issued on average per week, respectively, 285, 275 and
141 corporate bond ratings. We compute Ew for each of these three values. We set the yearly
discount factor  = 0:95, which means that d = 
1
360 = 0:999 86.
To obtain an estimate for the probability of success (no default) of good projects qg,
we use the global corporate average cumulative default rate (1981- 2014) of all issues rated
that appears in the S&Ps study 2014 Annual Global Corporate Default Study And Rating
Transitions(see table 24 in pages 56 and 57).21 Since this average default rate is 0:1078, we
set qg = 1 0:1078 = 0:892 2. The reason for using the average default rate of all issues rated
instead of the issues with a good rating only, is that in our model good projects represent
all those with a positive NPV. Thus, assuming real nancial markets are e¢ cient (at least
to some degree), it is reasonable to assume these projects are typically nanced (even if they
do not receive a top rating). In contrast, since bad projects in our model represent those
with a negative NPV, it is reasonable to assume they are usually not nanced. This also
means that it is not possible to obtain directly from the data an estimate for the probability
of default of bad projects. Therefore, we set somewhat arbitrarily qb equal to roughly half
of qg, i.e. we set qb = 0:45. Similarly, it is not easy to obtain an estimate for p and we set
p = 0:5. We set R = 1: 489 3 based on an estimate of the return on capital in the US in the
period 1995-2007.22 Finally, we use the asymptotically optimal k, as given in Proposition 2.
Given the above parameter values, we obtain that Es = 0:901. Thus, the value created
under sequential rating is approximately 90% of the value created in the rst-best allocation.
This measure is independent of the frequency with which new projects enter the market
(i.e., it is independent of N). Regarding the e¢ ciency of simultaneous rating, we obtain
that Ew = 0:952 if N = 285 (Moodys), Ew = 0:951 if N = 275 (S&P), and Ew = 0:932
if N = 141 (Fitch). These results indicate an e¢ ciency gain of weekly simultaneous rating
relative to sequential rating of approximately 5 percentage points in the case of Moodys
and S&P, and of 3 percentage points in the case of Fitch. In all cases, the benet stemming
from the economy of scale in rating more than compensates the cost of any delays in the
21This study is publicly available on the S&Ps webpage (https://www.standardandpoors.com/).
22More specically, R is calculated in the following way: R = (ROC=PK) 1=(1    (1  ) (1 + g)),
where ROC is the return on capital, PK is the price of capital in terms of the consumption good,  is the
depreciation rate of capital, and g is the productivity growth rate. The values for the ROC (11:4%) and
1=PK (0:979) are taken from Chou, et al. (2016)see Table 1; the value for g (2:5%) is taken from Jorgenson,
et al. (2008)see Figure 1. They are all for the US for the period 1995-2007. As for , it is set at 5%.
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implementation of projects.23
Finally, observe that the di¤erence Ew   Es constitutes a lower bound for the e¢ ciency
gains of adopting simultaneous rating once a week. Recall that Es is an upper bound for the
level of e¢ ciency under sequential rating, while Ew does not take into account the reputation
mechanism. If this mechanism is taken into account, the e¢ ciency level of simultaneously
rating issuers once a week will exceed Ew.
7 Discussion and Extensions
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our key ndings and explore some possible
extensions of our setting.
7.1 Rating Fees
The rating fee in the baseline model is paid ex post if the issuers project is nanced and
successful. In the discussion of Proposition 1 in Section 4.1, we discuss the case where the
rating fee is paid ex ante when the issuer accepts the rating. In both cases, it is assumed
that the rating fee depends on the cost of nance and on the quality of the issuer. We discuss
here two alternative types of rating fee: (i) a xed fee (i.e. independent of the cost of nance
and of the issuers quality) paid when the issuer accepts the rating; and (ii) a xed fee paid
up front when the issuer requests a rating. In both cases, we suppose issuers have retained
earnings with which they can pay the fee.
Fixed fees paid when issuers accept a rating. The benets of simultaneous rating
identied in the paper continue to exist in this case. The pooling equilibria discussed in
Section 4.2 continue to exist, and the asymptotic results of Proposition 2 continue to hold.
Even though the rating fee is xed, there is still a negative link between the number of good
ratings issued and the value of a good rating: if the number of good ratings exceeds a certain
threshold (dened by the equilibrium), investors will not trust the CRAs ratings, and no
issuer will pay the corresponding xed fee for a rating. Because of this negative link, the
CRA issues only a limited number of good ratings.
With xed fees, however, good and bad issuers pay the same for a rating, and it is only
weakly optimal for the CRA to give the good ratings to the best issuers on the market.
Since the CRAs incentive to give good ratings to good issuers is weak, the pooling equilibria
mentioned above are less robust. Yet, the benets of simultaneous rating relative to sequential
23Note that a reduction in the discount factor  has a very small e¤ect on the cost of delaying projects, as
the maximum period an issuer has to wait for a rating is only four days. For example, taking into account
only this e¤ect (i.e., ignoring the e¤ect that  might have on R), a reduction in  to 0.93 leaves Ew essentially
unchanged. And recall that Es does not depend on .
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rating remain. Under sequential rating, because of such weak incentives, the CRA never
creates value. If in a period the CRAs rating is trusted and the CRA can collect the fee by
giving a good rating, it will give the rating regardless of the quality of that periods issuer.
As such, the CRAs ratings are never trusted and cannot create value.
This analysis abstracts from reputational e¤ects for the CRA. If they are present, the
CRA will strictly prefer to give a good rating to a good issuer (who defaults with low
probability) than to a bad issuer (who defaults with high probability), even if both pay the
same fee. Hence, the presence of reputational e¤ects restores the robustness of the equilibria
identied in Section 4.2 and the associated asymptotic results under simultaneous rating.
Reputational e¤ects can also (partially) restore the credibility of ratings under sequential
rating. Nevertheless, as shown in the next section, the value created by the CRA when
reputational e¤ects are taken into account can be at most a fraction of the rst-best total
surplus. While the result is derived with rating fees that are paid ex post, it also applies in
the case of xed ratings fees that are paid ex ante. Thus, the benet of simultaneous rating
the paper highlights holds even when the rating fee is xed and paid ex-ante.
Fixed fees paid up front when issuers request a rating. Thus far, we have assumed
that issuers who reject the rating o¤ered by the CRA do not pay the rating fee. The CRAs
rating decision in such cases is directly linked to its revenue, creating a strong incentive for
rating ination. One way of breaking the link is to require that all issuers who request a
rating to the CRA pay the (xed) rating fee up front. This is what Moodys, S&P and Fitch
agreed to do in rating Residential MBSs as part of the Cuomo agreement of 2008.
Suppose, as in the Cuomo agreement, that issuers must pay the rating fee to the CRA up
front when they request a credit rating. Both under simultaneous rating and under sequential
rating there exists one equilibrium in which the CRA reports truthfully the quality of the
issuers who request a rating. Moreover, in this equilibrium, only the issuers with a good
project approach the CRA for a rating and their projects are nanced at a repayment of
1=qg. In other words the rst-best allocation is attained. Since the fee is paid up front, the
CRA is indi¤erent about the rating given to the issuer, and truthfully reporting the issuers
type to investors is an optimal decision for the CRA. If we focus on this equilibrium, there is
no gain of simultaneous rating relative to sequential rating. However, there is a problem with
this equilibrium: it is not robust to collusion between the CRA and the issuers. Since the
CRAs ratings are fully trusted by investors, the CRA has an incentive to approach issuers
who do not request a rating and o¤er them a good rating in exchange for the rating fee; and
those issuers have an incentive to accept the o¤er. But if investors anticipate this behavior,
they will no longer fully trust the CRAs ratings and the equilibrium collapses. Hence, when
collusion between the CRA and issuers cannot be prevented, requiring that rating fees be
paid up front may not ensure credible ratings.
By contrast, the mechanism proposed in this papersimultaneous ratingis collusion proof.
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In all the value-creating equilibria under simultaneous rating analyzed in Section 4 (where
rating fees are paid ex post), the CRAs rating decisions maximize the joint prot of the
coalition formed by the agency and the issuers.
An important question is whether simultaneous rating works when rating fees are paid
up front (even if collusion between the CRA and the issuers cannot be prevented). Even in
this case it works. Pooling equilibria similar to those described in Section 4.2 where the CRA
issues a xed number of good ratings k exist. If k is set optimally, which is around Np as
stated in Proposition 2, then good issuers request a rating to the CRA and bad issuers do
so with a certain small probability so that the total number of issuers that request a rating
hits closely k by the Law of Large Numbers. In these equilibria, the CRA lls the quota of k
good ratings rst with good issuers and then with bad issuers, as it gains nothing by doing
otherwise. Bad issuers are willing to pay the up-front fee because there is a chance that they
receive a good rating due to lack of good issuers. If the number of issuers who request a
rating is smaller than k, the CRA can invite some issuers to request a rating (as collusion
cannot be prevented). However, with the optimal number of good ratings k, the proportion
of the bad issuers who receive a good rating is very small and goes to zero as the number of
issuers goes to innity. Once again, the value created by the CRA asymptotically approaches
the value created in the rst-best allocation.
7.2 Commitment by Investors in a Finite Horizon
We have seen that ratings bear no credibility and create no value under sequential rating
with a nite number of periods. As discussed in Section 5.1, the inability to create value
persists even if the rating agency can commit to issue only a certain number of good ratings.
By contrast, the CRAs ratings could create value under sequential rating if investors
could commit ex ante to nance a given number of issuers. Indeed, part of the value-creating
equilibria identied in Proposition 1 would be recovered. To see this, suppose investors
commit to nance at a certain repayment C < R one issuer with a good rating. The optimal
strategy for the CRA is as follows: in the rst period, give the issuer a good rating if and
only if the issuer is good; if a good rating is not issued in period one, give a good rating
to the issuer in the second period regardless of its quality. The decision in the second
period is optimal because the CRA obtains a prot of q  (R   C) > 0 by issuing a good
rating, while it obtains zero prot otherwise. Regarding the decision in the rst period, if
the issuer is good the CRA is better o¤ giving the issuer a good rating than waiting since
qg  (R   C) > E(q)  (R   C), and if the issuer is bad the CRA is better o¤ waiting
because qb  (R   C1) < E(q)  (R   C). Thus, the CRA gives only one good rating
and gives it to a good issuer if there is one, which is the same outcome as in one particular
equilibrium identied in Proposition 1. Observe that if the period one issuer does not receive
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a good rating, the period two issuer receives a good rating regardless of its quality. Hence,
nancing it generates a loss to the investors (compensated by the gain of nancing an issuer
rated as good in period one which is good for sure). If investors lacked commitment power,
they would not nance the project in period two and the entire equilibrium would collapse.
When N is large, a similar argument can be applied to show that if investors can commit
to nance k projects with a good rating, then the results given in Proposition 2 especially
the asymptotic approximation to the rst best allocation can be recovered under sequential
rating. It is unlikely, however, that such commitment can be made in the corporate bonds
market where investors are dispersed and change over time.
7.3 Competition in the Market for Credit Ratings
While a complete analysis of the case where several CRAs compete for issuers is out of the
scope of this paper, we briey discuss one potential implication of competition for the benets
of simultaneous rating.
One point of the paper is to show that there is an economy of scale associated with
simultaneous rating. Recall that the CRA creates no value if it rates only one issuer. However,
as shown in Section 4.1, credit ratings can create value if the CRA rates two issuers. Also, as
shown in Section 4.2, for a large number of issuers, the value created by a CRA asymptotically
approaches the rst-best total surplus. Competition is likely to reduce the magnitude of this
economy of scale. For example suppose there are two CRAs and competition between them
leads to a split of the rating market. The scale of each CRA is reduced and part of the benet
of the economy of scale is lost. To illustrate this, consider the case of a large number N of
issuers studied in Section 4.2. In the case of a monopolist CRA, the loss in expected surplus
(relative to the rst-best) is the order of c
p
N , for some c > 0.24 If the market share of the
two CRAs is  and 1 , respectively, the surplus loss is in the order of cpN+cp(1  )N .
While in both cases the ratio of the loss to the rst-best is in the order of 1=
p
N , such loss
is clearly greater in the case of two CRAs than in the case of a monopolist CRA, sincep
N <
p
N +
p
(1  )N .
8 Conclusion
We argue in this paper that requiring a rating agency to report the ratings of several is-
suers simultaneously may discourage rating ination, increase the credibility and value of the
agencys ratings, and lead to a more e¢ cient allocation of funds. This is because simultane-
ous reporting of credit ratings allows for a link between the CRAs decisions on the ratings
of di¤erent issuers: by giving more good ratings, the rating agency lowers the credibility of
24See the proof of Proposition 2 for the complete mathematical expression of this loss and its derivation.
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its ratings and the fee it can charge for a good rating. We show that there is an economy
of scale associated with simultaneous rating. When the number of issuers simultaneously
rated is su¢ ciently large, the surplus generated in equilibrium asymptotically approaches
the rst-best surplus. We also show that while this link between the number of good ratings
issued and the value of a good rating may be present when issuers are rated (and nanced)
sequentially, it is less e¤ective than under simultaneous rating.
From a more practical point of view, the papers ndings suggest an extra benet to the
idea of synchronizing bond issuance, which practitioners have been considering mainly for its
potential benets to corporate bonds liquidity. Synchronization of bond issuance may allow
the benets of simultaneous rating highlighted in the paper to work, increasing the value
created by ratings. There are potential costs associated the implementation of simultaneous
rating. One of them is the potential delay in the implementation of projects, since rms may
have to wait more for a credit rating and for the funds needed to implement their projects.
In this respect, the periodicity with which credit ratings can be reported is important, as it
a¤ects the magnitude of both the benets and the cost of the scheme.
9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is given in three steps. We begin in Step 1 by showing
that in any value-creating equilibrium, if such an equilibrium exists, (i) C1 < C2 (and 1 >
2), and (ii) if the CRA issues only one good rating, the CRA gives it to a good issuer if there
is one. In Step 2, we show that no value-creating equilibrium exists if p (2  p)   Vb=(R).
Finally, in Step 3, we construct for the case where p (2  p) >  Vb=(R) a continuum of
value-creating equilibria, in all but one of which the CRA issues two good ratings on the
equilibrium path. When p is su¢ ciently high, in addition to the equilibria identied in this
proof, there exists another equilibrium. Also in that equilibrium, the CRA issues two good
ratings on the equilibrium path. These are all the equilibria of the game. See the Online
Appendix for a complete analysis and characterization of the equilibria.
Step 1: For claim (i): Suppose to the contrary that there exists a value-creating equilib-
rium in which C1  C2. Because the CRA creates value in this equilibrium, minfC1; C2g <
R. Thus, C2 < R. Since C1  C2 and C2 < R, the CRA issues two good good ratings regard-
less of the prole of the issuersqualities (q1; q2): by issuing two good ratings it obtains (q1+
q2)(R C2), while by issuing one good rating it obtains maxfq1; q2gmaxfR C1; 0g,
and (q1+ q2)(R C2) > maxfq1; q2g(R C2)  maxfq1; q2gmaxfR C1; 0g. As
the CRA rates both issuers as good irrespective of their qualities, in this equilibrium 2 = p.
It follows from (3) and (2) that C2 = 1=(pqg+(1  p)qb) > R, which contradicts the previous
assertion that C2 < R. Thus, C1 < C2 in any value-creating equilibria. Since C1 < C2 and
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by (3) Ck is connected with k by Ck = 1=[kqg + (1  k)qb], 1 > 2.
For claim (ii): As in any value-creating equilibrium C1 < C2, then C1 < R. Hence, if in
such an equilibrium the CRA issues only one good rating, it obtains qg(R C1) if it gives
the rating to a good issuer, while it obtains qb  (R   C1) if it gives the rating to a bad
issuer. The former payo¤ is larger because qg > qb and R   C1 > 0. Thus, the CRA gives
the good rating to a good issuer if there is one.
Step 2: Suppose to the contrary that there exists a value-creating equilibrium when
p (2  p)   Vb=(R). In this equilibrium, as the CRA creates value, C1 < R (as shown
in Step 1). Hence, for any given number of good issuers n 2 f0; 1; 2g, it obtains a positive
payo¤by issuing one good rating. Since the CRA obtains nothing by issuing no good ratings,
choosing k = 0 is never optimal. Hence the CRA either chooses k = 1 or k = 2. Let n
denote the probability that the CRA chooses k = 1 in state n. Hence, the CRA chooses
k = 2 with probability 1  n in state n. Moreover, let Pn denote the ex ante probability of
state n occurring, that is, P0 = (1  p)2; P1 = 2p(1  p) and P2 = p2. Since investors update
their beliefs according to Bayesrule (whenever possible) and when n = 1 the CRA gives the
good rating to the good issuer if it chooses k = 1, then investorsposteriors must satisfy
1 =
P11 + P22
P00 + P11 + P22
(5)
2 =
P1(1  1)=2 + P2(1  2)
P0(1  0) + P1(1  1) + P2(1  2)
; (6)
whenever the denominator is positive. We next consider separately three cases that jointly
capture all the possible forms that the equilibrium can take and show that none can be an
equilibrium.
First, suppose n = 1 for all n 2 f0; 1; 2g, that is, the CRA issues only one good rating
in all the states. Using (5), we obtain 1 = p (2  p). Since by assumption p (2  p) 
 Vb=(R), we obtain that 1   Vb=(R), which implies that C1 = 1=[1qg+(1 1)qb]  R,
contradicting the fact that in any value-creating equilibrium C1 < R.
Second, suppose (i) n < 1 for at least one n and (ii) n > 0 for at least one n (not
necessarily the same n), that is, both k = 1 (one good rating is issued) and k = 2 (two good
ratings are issued) are on the equilibrium path. In this case, both C1 < R and C2 < R,
necessarily. It follows that both 1 >  Vb=(R) and 2 >  Vb=(R). Using (5) and (6),
this implies that
P11 + P22 > [ Vb=(R)] [P00 + P11 + P22]
P1(1  1)=2 + P2(1  2) > [ Vb=(R)] [P0(1  0) + P1(1  1) + P2(1  2)]:
Summing both sides and using the fact that P0+P1+P2 = 1, we obtain that P1(1+1)=2+
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P2 >  Vb=(R); which, as P1+P2  P1(1+1)=2+P2, leads to P1+P2 >  Vb=(R), which
is contradictory with P1 + P2 = p (2  p)   Vb=(R).
Third, suppose n = 0 for all the n, that is, the CRA always issues two good ratings.
Since the CRA obtains a positive fee by doing so, C2 < R: However, as n = 0 for all n; by
(6), 2 = P1=2 + P2 < P1 + P2   Vb=(R); which implies C2 > R, a contradiction.
Step 3: In this step we prove the following: If p (2  p) >  Vb=(R); for each x 2 [u; 1],
with u = maxf0; 1   (1 p)2
p2
1 qb=qg Vb
Vg
g, there exists a value-creating equilibrium in which
2 = x; 1 = 1; and 0 = f(x); where f
0 > 0 and f(1) = 1. Observe that except for the
equilibrium in which 2 = 0 = 1, in all the other equilibria, ex ante the CRA chooses k = 2
(i.e. issues two good ratings) with probability P0(1   0) + P2(1   2) > 0. The proof is
given in the following steps.
Step 3.1. In this step we present necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an equilibrium
that will be used in the following steps. Let nk denote the CRAs expected prot from issuing
k 2 f1; 2g good ratings in state n 2 f0; 1; 2g. Recall that in a value-creating equilibrium
C1 < R and if the CRA chooses k = 1 when n = 1 the CRA gives the good rating to the good
issuer (see Step 1). Hence, 01 = qb  (R   C1), and 02 = 2qb  max fR  C2; 0g ; 11 =
21 = qg (R C1); 12 = (qb+ qg)max fR  C2; 0g, and 22 = 2qg max fR  C2; 0g.
A prole fn;k; Ckgn=0;1;2;k=1;2 constitutes a value-creating equilibrium if and only if
C1 < R and the following two equilibrium conditions hold:
(EC1) Given the CRAs strategy fngn=0;1;2, the investorsbeliefs satisfy Bayes rule whenever
possible, that is, (5) and (6) are satised whenever the denominator is di¤erent from
zero; and the repayment investors request satises
Ck =
1
kqg + (1  k)qb
; (7)
and
(EC2) Given the investorsbelief and strategy fk; Ckgk=1;2, for any n 2 f0; 1; 2g: if n1 > n2
then n = 1, if 
n
1 < 
n
2 then n = 0, and if n 2 (0; 1), then n1 = n2 .
Step 3.2. We show that if a prole f0; 1 = 1; 2;1; 2; C1 < R;C2g satises (EC1)
and
R  C1 = 2(R  C2), (8)
then it constitutes a value-creating equilibrium. To prove this, we only need to show that
the prole also satises (EC2). To see this, observe that C1 < R and (8) imply that C2 < R.
Next observe that if C1; C2 < R; then 01 = 
0
2 , qb  (R   C1) = 2qb  (R   C2), (8);
and 21 = 
2
2 , qg  (R   C1) = 2qg  (R   C2) , (8). Since 01 = 02 and 21 = 22,
any 0; 2 2 [0; 1] satisfy (EC2), as any 0; 2 2 [0; 1] is consistent with the CRAs optimal
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decision. Moreover, as 2(R   C2) > qg+qbqg (R   C2); (8) implies R   C1 >
qg+qb
qg
(R   C2) ,
qg(R  C1) > (qg + qb)(R  C2), 11 > 12. Hence 1 = 1 satises (EC2).
Step 3.3. We show that if p (2  p) >  Vb=(R); then for any 2 2 [u; 1]; there exists
a 0 = f(2) 2 [0; 1]; with f 0 > 0 and f(1) = 1; 1, 2, C1 < R and C2 such that the
prole f0; 1 = 1; 2;1; 2; C1 < R;C2g satises (EC1) and (8). Therefore, by Step 3.2 this
prole constitutes a value-creating equilibrium. To show this, we consider separately two
cases regarding the value of 2.
Case 1: Suppose rst that 2 = 1. In this case, let 0 = 1. Hence, n = 1 for all n and
k = 2 is o¤-equilibrium path, meaning that (6) is not applicable. By (5), 1 = p (2  p). If
p (2  p) >  Vb=(R), then 1 >  Vb=(R) and thus by (7) C1 = 1=[1qg+(1 1)qb] < R:
Since (6) is not applicable, any value of C2 is consistent with condition (EC1). Hence we can
pick one that satises equation (8).
Case 2: Suppose now that 2 < 1: In this case, both k = 1 and k = 2 are on equilibrium
path. As 1 = 1; (5) and (6) imply that
1 =
P1 + 2P2
0P0 + P1 + 2P2
and 2 =
(1  2)P2
(1  0)P0 + (1  2)P2
.
It follows from these two equations that
0 =
1  1
1
 P1 + P22
P0
and 1  0 =
1  2
2
 P2(1  2)
P0
. (9)
Hence, 2 satises:
1  1
1
 P1 + P22
P0
+
1  2
2
 P2(1  2)
P0
= 1. (10)
From (7) it follows that for all k = 1; 2,
1  k
k
=
qgCk   1
1  qbCk . (11)
Since 0 < k < 1 and Ck < R < 1=qb; this equation implies Ck > 1=qg in a value-creating
equilibrium. Substituting (11) for k = 1; 2 into (10) and rearranging, we obtain
qgC1   1
1  qbC1  (P1 + P22) +
qgC2   1
1  qbC2  P2(1  2) = P0. (12)
From (8), C2 = (C1 +R)=2: Substituting it into (12), we obtain
g(C1;2) 
qgC1   1
1  qbC1  (P1 + P22) +
qg(C1 +R)=2  1
1  qb(C1 +R)=2  P2(1  2) = P0: (13)
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A value-creating equilibrium exists if and only if there is a 2 2 [0; 1] such that equa-
tion (13) has a solution in C1 2 [1=qg; R). We next show that for each 2  maxf0; 1  
(1 p)2
p2
1 qb=qg Vb
Vg
g = u; such a solution exists and is unique.
Observe that g is continuous and g01 > 0 for all C1 2 (1=qg; R]. Moreover,
g(R;2) =
Vg
 Vb  (P1 + P22) +
Vg
 Vb  P2(1  2) =
Vg
 Vb  (P1 + P2).
Thus, since p (2  p) >  Vb=(R), then P1 + P2 > ( Vb)=(Vg   Vb), P1 + P2 > ( Vb)=Vg 
P0 , g(R) > P0. It follows that equation (13) has a solution in C1 2 [1=qg; R) (and that
solution is unique) if and only if g(1=qg)  P0. Since
g(1=qg;2) =
Vg
1  qb=qg   Vb  P2(1  2),
then g(1=qg)  P0 if and only if 2  maxf0; 1   P0P2
1 qb=qg Vb
Vg
g = u. Hence, we obtain
the existence of the equilibrium. For a given 2 2 [u; 1); the equilibrium is as follows:
C1 = C1(2), where C1(2) is the solution to (13) given 2; C2 = (C1(2) + R)=2, and from
(9) and (11), we obtain that 0 is given by
0 =
qgC1(2)  1
1  qbC1(2)
 P1 + P22
P0
:= f(2): (14)
Observe that 0  0 as 1=qg  C1(2) < R < 1=qb: The fact that 0  1 follows from
f 0 > 0 and f(1) = 1; which we prove next. The fact that f 0(2) > 0 follows from the fact
that C 01(2) > 0; which holds true because C
0
1(2) =  g
0
2
g01
and we have seen g01 > 0 while
g02 = [
qgC1 1
1 qbC1  
qg(C1+R)=2 1
1 qb(C1+R)=2 ]  P2 < 0. Finally, to see that f(1) = 1, observe that from the
second equation of (9), 0 = 1 if 2 = 1. Therefore, when 2 ! 1; the equilibrium in case 2
converges to the equilibrium in case 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Considering that the CRA obtains a share  of the surplus of the
project, by maximizing its payo¤, it also maximizes the social surplus, which is calculated be-
low. Given the number of issuers N , if the realized number of good issuers is n 2 f0; 1; ::; Ng;
the ex-post value created (or total surplus generated) in a pooling equilibrium with threshold
k is kVg if n  k and nVg + (k   n)Vb if n < k. Thus, the expected total surplus (before n is
29
realized) associated with k is given by
V (k;N) = Pr(n  k) kVg +
Xk 1
n=0
Pn(nVg + (k   n)Vb)
= Pr(n  k) kVg + Pr(n < k) kVb + (Vg   Vb)
Xk 1
n=0
Pnn
= kVg   Pr(n < k)k  (Vg   Vb) + (Vg   Vb)
Xk 1
n=0
Pnn
= kVg   (Vg   Vb)[Pr(n < k)k  
Xk 1
n=0
Pnn];
where Pn denotes the ex-ante probability that n issuers are good. The optimal k maximizes
V (k;N). Finding the optimal k is not a trivial problem. Therefore, we next use an asymptotic
approximation of V (k;N).
We show in the Online Appendix (see Lemma 7) that
V (k;N)
N
= pVg +
r
p(1  p)
N
fNVg   (Vg   Vb)[(N)N + (N)]g+ o( 1p
N
),
where  := k Npp
Np(1 p) 2 R, and (:) and (:) denote the c.d.f and density functions, respec-
tively, of the Standard Normal. Hence, asymptotically, givenN; the optimal k; or equivalently
the optimal ; is obtained by solving:
max

Vg   (Vg   Vb)[()+ ()].
Observe that 0() = () and 0() =  (). The rst-order condition associated with
this maximization problem is Vg   (Vg   Vb)() = 0, from which it follows that the optimal
 does not depend on N and is implicitly dened by the condition () = Vg=(Vg   Vb).
Hence, asymptotically, the optimal k is k = Np + 
p
Np(1  p) and the expected total
surplus evaluated at the optimal pooling equilibrium is
V (k) = N
 
pVg  
r
p(1  p)
N
(Vg   Vb)()
!
:
Since the rst-best expected total surplus is V FB(N) = NpVg, we obtain that
V (k; N)
V FB(N)
= 1 
r
1  p
Np
(1  Vb
Vg
)(), (15)
which means that V (K; N) asymptotically approaches V FB(N) in the order of N 1=2. Fi-
nally, observe that under the optimal k, the probability that a project with a good rating is
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indeed good when N is su¢ ciently large is given by
Nk = Pr(n  k) 1 +
Xk 1
n=0
Pn
n
k
= 1  () + N
k

Xk 1
n=0
Pn
n
N
+O(
1p
N
)
= 1  () + 1
p+ 
q
p(1 p)
N
 [p() 
r
p(1  p)
N
()] +O(
1p
N
)
= 1  () + 1
p
 (1  
r
1  p
Np
) [p() 
r
p(1  p)
N
()] +O(
1p
N
)
= 1  () + (1  
r
1  p
Np
) [() 
s
(1  p)
Np
()] +O(
1p
N
)
= 1  () + () +O( 1p
N
)
= 1 +O(
1p
N
).
It converges to one in the order of N 1=2. Finally, the fact that this probability converges to
one ensures that all projects with a good rating are actually good with a probability close to
one and are thus nanced in equilibrium, as was initially supposed.
Proof of Proposition 4. In the model, the CRA obtains a xed share of the social
surplus. Hence the equilibria in which the CRA obtains the maximum equilibrium payo¤ are
also those with the maximum social surplus among all the equilibria.
Let ht denote the history of ratings issued by the CRA until the beginning of period t,
Ht denote the set of all such histories, and E denote the set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
of the game. Let also ve;ht denote the continuation value to the CRA in equilibrium e at
the beginning of period t given history ht. Observe that the continuation value of the CRA
at the beginning of a given period depends only on the public history up to that period.
This is because this value is fully determined by the sequence of repayments required by
investors in the future and such repayments depend only on the (public) history of ratings.
We can dene the set V = fv = ve;htje 2 E; ht 2 Ht; t = 1; 2; :::g. This is the set of all
the continuation values to the CRA in any Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. V is non-empty,
since there always exists an equilibrium in which investors never trust the CRAs ratings
and the CRA never issues a rating, which implies that 0 2 V. Moreover, V is bounded from
above, since the value created by the CRA cannot exceed V FBs . Let v  supV, which exists
and is nite, since V is non-empty and bounded from above. If v = 0, then the proposition
trivially holds. We next prove the proposition for the case where v > 0, that is, we prove
that v   (1  qb=qg) V FBs . Before we proceed, observe that to nd an upper bound for
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v there is no loss in considering only equilibria where the CRA always gives a good rating to
an issuer if he is good, as its continuation value is lower otherwise.
By denition of v, it follows that for any given " 2 (0; (1 )v), there exist v 2 V such that
v > v  ". Consider the equilibrium, e; and the history ht such that ve;ht equals this v. Let 
and C denote, respectively, the investorsbeliefs and the repayment requested by investors
to nance the issuer in (the current) period t (namely the rst period of the subgame after
history ht) if he obtains a good rating from the CRA. Let v0 denote the continuation value
to the CRA at the beginning of period t + 1 if it does not give a good rating in period t,
and v1 denote that value if it does. Finally, let  denote the equilibrium probability that the
CRA recommends the issuer in period t in the event he is bad.
Observe rst that C < R, otherwise the CRA obtains zero in period t, implying that
v = v0  v, which contradicts v > v   " > v   (1  )v. Observe also that we can write,
v = p [qg  (R  C) + v1] + (1  p) f [qb  (R  C) + v1] + (1  ) v0g
= [pqg + (1  p)qb] (R  C) +   v1 + (1  ) v0; (16)
where  := p+(1 p) is the ex ante probability that the CRA issues a good rating in period t.
Given the CRAs rating strategy in period t, consistency of beliefs implies  = p=(p+(1 p)),
which by (3) implies that
C =
p+ (1  p)
pqg + (1  p)qb . (17)
Substituting it into (16), we obtain
v = [pVg + (1  p)Vb] + v1 + (1  )v0. (18)
Next, observe that because C < R, then  < 1. Thus, contingent on the period-t
issuer being bad, the CRA must not be strictly better o¤ rating him as good than not
doing so, that is, qb  (R   C) + v1  v0; or v1  v0   qb  (R   C). Combining
this inequality with (18) and using the fact that by denition v0  v, it follows that v 
[pVg+(1 p)Vb qb(R C)]+v0  f()+v, where f() := pVg+(1 p)Vb qb(R C).
From this and the fact that v   " < v, it follows that v   "=(1  ) <   f()=(1  ) for
any " 2 (0; (1  )v); which implies that v < max01 f()=(1  ) + "=(1  ), and since
this inequality holds for any " > 0, we have:
v   max
01
f()=(1  ). (19)
We next calculate max01 f(). Using (17) and  := p + (1   p), we can write
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f() = pVg + (1  p)Vb   [p+ (1  p)]  qb[R  p+(1 p)pqg+(1 p)qb ]. Then,
f 0 =  (1  p)

p(qg   qb)
pqg + (1  p)qb
2
< 0.
Therefore, max01 f() = f(0) = pVg(1   qb=qg). It follows by (19) that v    (1  
qb=qg) pVg=(1  ) =  (1  qb=qg) V FBs . This completes the proof.
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FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
10 Online Appendix
This online appendix consists of a characterization and derivation of all the equilibria of the
game under simultaneous rating whenN = 2, the derivation of the asymptotic approximation
of V (k;N) used in the proof of Proposition 2, and the proof of Proposition 5 in the paper.
10.1 Full Characterization of the Equilibria under Simultaneous
Rating when N = 2
We present here a complete analysis and characterization of the equilibria. Parts of the
material presented in the proof of Proposition 1 may be appear repeated here. We begin
with a preliminary analysis on the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a value-creating
equilibrium. We then present and prove a proposition that o¤ers a complete characterization
of all those equilibria.
Recall that in a value-creating equilibrium, (i) both issuers ask for a rating from the CRA
because if the CRA serves only one issuer then it cannot create value as we show at the
beginning of Section 4; and (ii) if the CRA issues only one good rating, the CRA gives it
to a good issuer if there is one (see Proposition 1). Hence, to complete the characterization
of the CRAs strategy in a value-creating equilibrium, it is su¢ cient to characterize the
CRAs choice of the number of good ratings it issues given the number of good issuers n.
Hence, in the remainder of this section, with some abuse of language, we call the CRAs
strategy the prole fngn=0;1;2, where n is the probability that the CRA chooses to issue
one good ratingi.e. k = 1in state n 2 f0; 1; 2g: This means that the CRA chooses k = 2
with probability 1   n since k = 0 is never optimal for the CRA. As in the main text,
the investors beliefs and strategy is a prole of fk; Ckgk=1;2: For convenience of exposition,
let nk denote the CRAs expected prot from issuing k 2 f1; 2g good ratings in state n 2
f0; 1; 2g. Recall than in a value-creating equilibrium C1 < R. Hence, 01 = qb  (R   C1),
11 = 
2
1 = qg(R C1), 02 = 2qbmax fR  C2; 0g; 12 = (qb+ qg)max fR  C2; 0g,
and 22 = 2qg  max fR  C2; 0g.
Given this, a prole fn;k; Ckgn=0;1;2;k=1;2 constitutes a value-creating equilibrium if and
only if:
(i) Given the CRAs strategy fngn=0;1;2, the investorsbeliefs satisfy Bayes rule whenever
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possible, that is,
1 =
P11 + P22
P00 + P11 + P22
(20)
2 =
P1(1  1)=2 + P2(1  2)
P0(1  0) + P1(1  1) + P2(1  2)
(21)
whenever their denominator is di¤erent from zero, and the repayment investors request
satises
Ck =
1
kqg + (1  k)qb
, (22)
and C1 < R (if Ck > R, they refuse to nance the issuers); and
(ii) Given the investorsbelief and strategy fk; Ckgk=1;2, for any n 2 (0; 1; 2g; if n1 > n2
then n = 1, if 
n
1 < 
n
2 then n = 0, and if n 2 (0; 1), then n1 = n2 .
Since k is determined by fngn=0;1;2 and Ck is determined by by k; in the characteri-
zation of the equilibria that follows, we state only fngn=0;1;2, i.e. we state only the CRAs
strategy.
Before proceeding, we dene two values that will be useful for the characterization of the
equilibria. Let p be the unique root for p on the interval [0; 1] of the following equation
2(R  1
 (p)qg + (1   (p))qb ) = R 
1
qg
;
where  (p) = p2=[(1  p)2 + p2]; and let
u  maxf0; 1  (1  p)
2
p2
1  qb=qg   Vb
Vg
g.
We can now o¤er a complete characterization of the value-creating equilibria of the game.
Proposition 6 Suppose p (2  p) >  Vb=(R). Then, the value-creating equilibria of the
game, which depend on the ex-ante probability p that an issuer is good, are as follows:
(i) If p  p, then for each x 2 [u; 1] there exists an equilibrium in which 2 = x; 1 = 1
and
0 =
qgC1(2)  1
1  qbC1(2)
 P1 + P22
P0
,
where C1(2) is the solution for C1 of
qgC1   1
1  qbC1  (P1 + P22) +
qg(C1 +R)=2  1
1  qb(C1 +R)=2  P2(1  2) = P0.
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This 0 increases with 2 and 0 = 1 at 2 = 1.
(ii) If p > p, then, in addition to the equilibrium above, there is an equilibrium in which
0 = 2 = 0 and 1 = min f1; b1g ; where b1 is the unique root for 1 on the interval
(0;1) of the following equation
qg + qb
qg
(R  1
2(1)qg + (1  2(1))qb
) = R  1
qg
,
where 2(1) is given by (21) when 0 = 2 = 0.
As we can see, there exists a continuum of equilibria in which the CRA creates value
(observe that u < 1). Moreover, there exist equilibria in which the CRA gives a good rating
to both issuers and investors trust those ratings enough to nance both issuers. We now
prove the proposition. The proof is considerably long, as several cases need to be considered
separately.
Proof. In any value creating equilibrium, C1 < C2 and C1 < R. Thus, either C1 < R  C2
or C1 < C2 < R. We consider each of these cases separately.
Case A: C1 < R  C2: In this case, n2 = 0 for any n. Thus, for all n 2 f0; 1; 2g
the CRA chooses k = 1; that is, n = 1. By (20), 1 = P1 + P2 = p (2  p). By (22),
C1 = 1=[(P1 + P2) qg + P0qb]: As k = 2 is o¤-the-equilibrium path, we can choose any value
for 2 that is consistent with C2  R; that is, we can choose any 2   Vb=(R): Given
1 = p (2  p) >  Vb=(R); we have C1 < R: Hence, fn = 1gn=0;1;2 underpins some value
creating equilibria, which are special case of part (i) of the proposition with x = 1:
Case B: C1 < C2 < R: In this case,
01  02 , R  C1  2(R  C2)
11  12 , R  C1 
qg + qb
qg
(R  C2)
21  22 , R  C1  2(R  C2):
From direct inspection of these conditions and the fact that qg+qb
qg
(R   C2) < 2(R   C2) as
R C2 > 0; one obtains that there are three relevant subcases regarding the values of R C1
and R  C2, which are analyzed separately in next three subcases.
Subcase B.1: Suppose R   C1 < ((qg + qb)=qg)(R   C2) < 2(R   C2). In this case
n2 > 
n
1 for all n 2 f0; 1; 2g. Hence, if there is an equilibrium in this subcase, in this
equilibrium the CRA issues two good ratings regardless of the number of good issuers, that
is, n = 0. Bayesian updating by investors implies that 2 = p. It follows from (22) that
C2 = 1=(pqg + (1   p)qb) > R, which contradicts the supposition that C2 < R in case B.
Hence, there is no value-creating equilibrium in this subcase.
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Subcase B.2: Suppose that ((qg + qb)=qg)(R C2)  R C1 < 2(R C2). In this case,
n2 > 
n
1 for n 2 f0; 2g and 11  12. Hence, if a value-creating equilibrium exists for this
case, n = 0 for n 2 f0; 2g. From (20) and (21), 1 = 1 hence C1 = 1=qg and that
2 =
P1(1  1)=2 + P2
P0 + P1(1  1) + P2
; (23)
If p  1=2 and hence P0  P2, then 2 decreases with 1, which implies that 2  P1=2+P2 =
p. It follows from (22) that C2 > 1=(pqg + (1  p)qb) > R, which contradicts the supposition
that C2 < R. To nd value creating equilibria, we focus on the case with p > 1=2: In this
case, 2 increases with 1 and hence C2 = 1=[2qg + (1  2)qb] := C2(1) decreases with 1:
At 1 = 1; 2 reaches
 (p) :=
P2
P0 + P2
=
p2
(1  p)2 + p2 ;
and hence C2 reaches
C(p) :=
1
 (p)qg + (1   (p))qb :
Note that  0(p) > 0;  (1=2) = 1=2 < p and  (1) = 1 and hence C 0(p) < 0; C(1=2) >
1
pqg+(1 p)qb > R and C(1) =
1
qg
: Dene p and p respectively by
qg + qb
qg
(R  C(p)) = R  1
qg
2(R  C(p)) = R  1
qg
:
Then p and p uniquely exist and satisfy 1 > p > p > 1=2: Depending on the value of p; there
are three scenarios to consider.
If p  p: In this scenario,
qg + qb
qg
(R  C2(1)) = R  C1; (24)
that is, 11 = 
1
2; has a unique solution 1 = b 2 (0; 1] because, if we let f(1) denote the
left hand side of (24), then (i) f 0 =   qg+qb
qg
C 02 > 0; (ii) at 1 = 0; as 2 = p and hence
C2 =
1
pqg+(1 p)qb > R; we have f < 0 < R   1qg = R   C1; and (iii) at 1 = 1; f =
qg+qb
qg
(R C(p))jpp  qg+qbqg (R C(p)) = R C1. Therefore, f0 = 0; 1 = b; 2 = 0;1 = 1;
2 given by (23), C1 = 1=qg; C2 = C2(1)g forms a value creating equilibrium.
If p < p < p: In this scenario, ((qg+qb)=qg)(R C(p)) < R C1 < 2(R C(p)); that is, at
1 = 1 (and 0 = 2 = 0); 
n
2 > 
n
1 for n 2 f0; 2g and 11 > 12: Thus, f0 = 0; 1 = 1; 2 =
0;1 = 1; 2 given by (23), C1 = 1=qg; C2 = C(p)g forms a value creating equilibrium.
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Note that at p = p; the root of (24) for 1; namely b; equals 1 and that b > 1 if p < p:
Thus the two scenarios can be summarized as 1 = min(1; b):
If p  p: In this scenario, R C1  2(R C(p)) > ((qg + qb)=qg)(R C(p)): This cannot
be consistent with inequalities ((qg + qb)=qg)(R   C2)  R   C1 < 2(R   C2); which dene
this subcase. The subcase with which it is consistent is considered as follows.
Subcase B.3: Suppose that ((qg + qb)=qg)(R C2) < 2(R C2)  R C1. In this case,
n1  n2 for n 2 f0; 2g and 11 > 12. Hence, if a value-creating equilibrium exists, 1 = 1. If
2(R C2) < R C1, then n1 > n2 for all n 2 f0; 2g and in equilibrium 0 = 2 = 1. In this
scenario, the CRAs strategy is the same as was in Case A. And again, k = 2 is o¤-equilibrium
path. The only di¤erence is that now 2 has to be consistent with 2(R   C2) < R   C1;
rather R  C2  0:
We are left to consider the scenario that k = 2 is on equilibrium path, that is,
R  C1 = 2(R  C2). (25)
and n < 1 for at least one n 2 f0; 2g: Then,
1 =
P1 + 2P2
0P0 + P1 + 2P2
and 2 =
(1  2)P2
(1  0)P0 + (1  2)P2
. (26)
It follows from these two equations respectively that
0 =
1  1
1
 P1 + P22
P0
and 1  0 =
1  2
2
 P2(1  2)
P0
. (27)
Hence, 2 satises:
1  1
1
 P1 + P22
P0
+
1  2
2
 P2(1  2)
P0
= 1. (28)
From (22) it follows that for all i = 1; 2,
1  i
i
=
qgCi   1
1  qbCi . (29)
Note that as Ci < R < 1=qb in the subcase, i > 0 implies Ci < 1=qg: Substituting (29) for
k = 1; 2 into (28) and rearranging, we obtain
qgC1   1
1  qbC1  (P1 + P22) +
qgC2   1
1  qbC2  P2(1  2) = P0. (30)
All together, in this scenario a value creating equilibrium exists if and only if there is a
2 2 [0; 1] such that the simultaneous equations of (25) and (30) has a solution for (C1; C2) 2
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[1=qg; R]  [1=qg; R]: We next show that for each 2  maxf0; 1   (1 p)
2
p2
1 qb=qg Vb
Vg
g such a
solution thus a value creating equilibrium uniquely exists.
Using (25) to eliminate C2 in (30), we obtain
g(C1;2) 
qgC1   1
1  qbC1  (P1 + P22) +
qg(C1 +R)=2  1
1  qb(C1 +R)=2  P2(1  2) = P0: (31)
Observe that g is continuous and g01 > 0 for all C1 2 (1=qh; R]. Moreover,
g(R;2) =
Vg
 Vb  (P1 + P22) +
Vg
 Vb  P2(1  2) =
Vg
 Vb  (P1 + P2).
Thus, g(R) > P0 , P1+P2 > ( Vb)=Vg P0 , P1+P2 > ( Vb)=(Vg Vb), which is equivalent
to p (2  p) >  Vb=(R), the condition under which the value creating equilibria exist. It
follows that equation (31) has a solution in C1 2 [1=qg; R] (and that solution is unique) 
denote it by C1(2) if and only if g(1=qg)  P0. Since
g(1=qg;2) =
Vg
1  qb=qg   Vb  P2(1  2),
this condition is satised if and only if 2  maxf0; 1 P0P2
1 qb=qg Vb
Vg
g = maxf0; 1  (1 p)2
p2
1 qb=qg Vb
Vg
g.
With (25), C2 2 [1=qg; R] whenever C1 2 [1=qg; R]. Hence, we obtain the existence of the
equilibrium.
Given 2; by (27) and (29), 0 =
qgC1(2) 1
1 qbC1(2) 
P1+P22
P0
: This 0 increases with 2 because
g02 = [
qgC1 1
1 qbC1  
qg(C1+R)=2 1
1 qb(C1+R)=2 ]P2 < 0 and hence C 01(2) =  
g02
g01
> 0:Moreover, from the second
equation of (27), 0 = 1 at 2 = 1. That is, there is a continuity between these two scenarios
of this subcase.
10.2 Asymptotic Approximation of V (k;N)
We present in this section the derivation of the asymptotic approximation of V (k;N) used
in the proof of Proposition 2.
Lemma 7 Let (:) and (:) denote the c.d.f and density functions, respectively, of the Stan-
dard Normal distribution. Then,
V (k;N)
N
= pVg +
r
p(1  p)
N
fVg   (Vg   Vb)[()+ ()]g+ o( 1p
N
),
where  = k Npp
Np(1 p) .
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Proof. We know that V (k;N) = kVg   (Vg   Vb)[Pr(n < k)k  
Xk 1
n=0
Pnn]. This implies
that
V (k;N)
N
=
k
N
Vg   (Vg   Vb)
Pr(n < k)k  
Xk 1
n=0
Pnn
N
. (32)
As k = Np+ 
p
Np(1  p), we can write
k
N
= p+ 
r
p(1  p)
N
. (33)
Let t := n Npp
Np(1 p) . By the Central Limit Theorem, asymptotically, t  N(0; 1) with density
(t) = (
p
2) 1e
 t2
2 and c.d.f. (t) =
Z t
 1
(s)ds. By the Barry-Esseen Theorem, for N
large,
Pr(n < k) = () +O(
1p
N
). (34)
Observe also thatXk 1
n=0
Pn
n
N
= Pr(n < k)E[
n
N
j n < k]
= Pr(n < k)E[
Np+ t
p
Np(1  p)
N
j n < k]
= Pr(n < k)E[p+ t
r
p(1  p)
N
j n < k]
= Pr(n < k)p+
r
p(1  p)
N
 Pr(n < k)E[t j t < ]
= Pr(n < k)p+
r
p(1  p)
N
Z 
 1
t(t)dt+ o(
1p
N
).
Using the fact that
Z 
 1
(t)tdt =
Z 
 1
1p
2
e
 t2
2 tdt =  (), we can write
Xk 1
n=0
Pn
n
N
= Pr(n < k)p 
r
p(1  p)
N
() + o(
1p
N
): (35)
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Using (33), (34) and (35) into (32), we obtain
V (k;N)
N
= Vg  (p+ 
r
p(1  p)
N
)
 (Vg   Vb)
8<: Pr(n < k) (p+ 
q
p(1 p)
N
)
 [Pr(n < k) p 
q
p(1 p)
N
() + o( 1p
N
)]
9=;
= pVg +
r
p(1  p)
N
Vg  
r
p(1  p)
N
(Vg   Vb)[()+ ()] + o( 1p
N
)
= pVg +
r
p(1  p)
N
fVg   (Vg   Vb)[()+ ()]g+ o( 1p
N
)
which completes the proof.
10.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof of Proposition 5. Let rt 2 f?; b; gg denote the rating issued by the CRA in period
t (where ? indicates that no rating was issued), 't 2 f?; f; sg denote the performance of
the project of the issuer of period t (where ? indicates that the project was not funded),
ht = fr ; 'gt 1=1 denote the rating and performance history until the beginning of period t,
Ht denote the set of all such histories , and E denote the set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
of the game. Let also ve;ht denote the continuation value to the CRA in equilibrium e at the
beginning of period t given history ht. Observe that the continuation value of the CRA at
the beginning of a given period depends only on the public history up to that period. This
is because this value is fully determined by the sequence of repayments required by investors
in the future and such repayments depend only on the public history of ratings and projects
performance. We can dene the set V = fve;htje 2 E; ht 2 Ht; t = 1; 2; :::g. This is the set
of all the continuation values to the CRA in any Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The set V is
non-empty, since there always exists an equilibrium in which investors never trust the CRAs
ratings and the CRA never issues a rating, implying that 0 2 V. Moreover, V is bounded
from above, since the CRAs payo¤ cannot exceed V FBs . Hence v  supv2V v exists and is
nite. Considering that the CRA obtains a xed share of  of the social surplus, the social
value created by the CRA is thus bounded from above by 1
a
 v: To prove the proposition,
hence, it su¢ ces to show that v   [(qg   qb)=(qg   qgqb)]V FBs :
If v = 0, then the proposition trivially holds. Now consider the case where v > 0.
Before we proceed, observe that to nd an upper bound for v there is no loss in considering
only equilibria where the CRA always gives a good rating to an issuer if he is good, as
its continuation value is lower otherwise. By denition of v, it follows that for any given
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" 2 (0; (1 )v), there exist v 2 V such that v > v  ". As v 2 V, there exists an equilibrium
e and history ht such that v = ve;ht : Focus on period t; which is the rst period of the subgame
after history ht: Let  denote the investorsbeliefs in this period t about the issuers quality
if he obtains a good rating and C denote the according repayment requested by investors
if they nance him. Let v0; v
f
1 and v
s
1 denote the equilibrium continuation values to the
CRA at the beginning of the next period (i.e. period t+ 1) if in period t, respectively, CRA
abstains from giving a good rating (or the rating fails to draw nancing), the CRA gives a
good rating to the issuer and the issuers project is nanced and fails, and the CRA gives
a good rating to the issuer and the issuers project is nanced and succeeds. Finally, let 
denote the probability that the CRA recommends the issuer in period t if he is bad.
Observe that C < R, otherwise the CRA obtains zero in period t, implying that v =
v0  v, which contradicts v > v   " > v   (1   )v. Since C < R, then  < 1, that is,
the CRA abstains from recommending a bad project in period t with a positive probability.
(Recall that if  = 1,  = p, and by C = 1=(pqg + (1   p)qb) > R). This means that the
value to the CRA from recommending a bad issuer in period t cannot exceed the value from
abstaining to recommend the issuer, or
fb + [qbv
s
1 + (1  qb)vf1 ]  v0; (36)
where fi = qi(R C) is the value of the rating fee charged to an issuer of quality i = g; b.
This implies that
vf1 
v0   fb   qbvs1
(1  qb) . (37)
Moreover, the value of the CRA contingent on the period-t issuer being bad is
vb  max
n
fb + [qbv
s
1 + (1  qb)vf1 ]; v0
o
= v0; (38)
where the equality follows from (36). Similarly, the value of the CRA contingent on the
project being good, as the CRA recommends it with probability one, is
vg = fg + qgv
s
1 + (1  qg)vf1 .
The value of the CRA in the subgame after ht before the type of the period-t issuer is known,
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namely v; satises v = p vg + (1  p) vb. From this, (37) and (38), it follows that
v  pffg + qgvs1 + (1  qg) 
v0   fb   qbvs1
(1  qb) g+ (1  p)  v0
=
1
1  qbfp(R  C) + pv
s
1 + [(1  p)(1  qb) + p(1  qg)]v0g:
 1
1  qbfp(R  C) + (1  qb)vg
 1
1  qbfp(R 
1
qg
)g+ v
=
pVg
qg(1  qb) + v, (39)
where the second inequality follows from vs1  v and v0  v, the third inequality from
C  1=qg, and the last equality from Vg = qgR   1. On the other hand, we have v > v   ":
Therefore, from inequality (39) it follows that
v   " < pVg
qg(1  qb) + v ,
v <

qg(1  qb) 
pVg
1   +
"
1   : (40)
Since the above inequality holds for any " 2 (0; (1  )v) and pvg=(1  ) = V FBs , it follows
that
v  
qg(1  qb)  V
FB
s = 
(qg   qb)
qg(1  qb)  V
FB
s .
This completes the proof.
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